We show that in supply chains where retailer effort can substantially affect sales, longer lead times can result in higher sales for the manufacturer. Hence, manufacturers might not want to reduce lead times even if it was free or inexpensive to do so. Using a one-period model where retailer effort affects sales and is exerted after stocking quantities are determined, manufacturers and retailers have a price-only contract, lead time from the manufacturer to retailer could be reduced to zero at no additional cost (i.e. there were no capacity constraints, and there was no added per unit cost of producing with short lead times), and there is no competition (i.e., the retailer and manufacturer have exclusive contracts), we still find conditions under which manufacturers are better off sticking to longer lead times. Our paper highlights how supply chain contracts could act as a potential barrier to reducing lead times.
Introduction
We show that in supply chains where retailer effort can substantially affect sales, the retailer exerts effort after choosing stocking quantity and observing demand, and where the manufacturer and retailer have a wholesale price only contract, longer lead times can result in higher sales for the manufacturer. We also show that, in the presence of retailer effort that is exerted after demand is observed, even if lead time from the manufacturer to retailer could be reduced to zero at no additional cost and there was no competition, there would still be conditions under which manufacturers would be better off sticking to longer lead times. This happens despite the fact that, under our assumptions, because there is no explicit cost of lead time reduction, an integrated company would always reduce lead times). Moreover, when demand is uniformly distributed, the wholesale price in a price-only contract is exogenously determined, and understocking costs equal overstocking costs, the manufacturer would never prefer to reduce her i lead times.
We compare supply chain performance under two scenarios: when the retailer has to choose stocking quantity before, and after observing demand. We call the former "long lead time case", and the latter, "short lead time case". In the long lead time case, the retailer may find it optimal to buy more quantity than under short lead times, knowing that, once he has bought this inventory, he will be likely to work hard to sell it. Thus, the retailer may buy inventory to "induce himself" to exert high effort. Consequently, we find that the effort effect may result in the manufacturer experiencing higher sales in the long lead time case, even if we allow the manufacturer to set her own transfer prices from manufactuer to retailer.
Having identified the phenomenon, we then proceed to discuss different contract forms that could potentially induce manufacturers to reduce their lead times. We show that price plus lump-sum money transfer contracts (i.e. a "franchise fee" plus a constant price contract) would achieve first-best effort and quantity and induce the manufacturer to reduce her lead time to the retailer, and take-or-pay contracts (i.e. a contract that forces the retailer to buy a pre-determined minimum quantity) would induce the manufacturer to reduce lead time but will not achieve firstbest stocking quantity or effort.
Our paper is significant managerially because it highlights how supply chain contracts could act as a potential barrier to reducing lead times from manufacturers to distributors and offers alternate contract forms that could be used to overcome this barrier. Consider the automotive industry where each retailer (i.e., car dealership) typically carries products from a single manufacturer (e.g., Ford, Toyota, Buick, etc.) and most industry executives believe that retailer effort (either salesperson effort or local advertising by the car dealer) substantially affects demand at a particular location. In the US, a 40 day lead time for custom cars (or made to order cars) is considered fast, Holweg and Pil (2004) . Fisher (1997) argues that, owing to this lead time, more than 90% of customers buy what is in the dealers' lots; he further argues that the lengthy
Literature Review
This paper focuses on a manufacturer and a retailer that deal exclusively (i.e. we do not explicitly model a retailer that carries competing products), and a retailer that can exert effort to increase demand after knowing what demand is going to be, and asks the following questions: In this scenario, would there be cases when manufacturers would prefer long to short lead times, even if there was no (explicit) cost of reducing such lead timess? What is the effect that retailer effort has on the manufacturer's incentives to reduce lead times?
Others have argued that certain conditions may limit the desirability to manufacturers of reducing lead times. The most frequently cited arguments revolve around costs: e.g., Donohue (2000) , assumes that producing with short lead times implies a higher per unit cost to the manufacturer; Fisher and Raman (1996) include a capacity constraint that limits production after information about demand is improved, and assume that increasing that capacity has a cost. In our model, however, reducing lead times is free (i.e. there are no capacity constraints, and there is no added per unit cost of producing with short lead times).
Another line of research that deals with the effect competition may have on manufacturer's incentives to reduce lead times. Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2003) were the first to show analytically that manufacturers might prefer longer lead times when the retailer carries substitute products from other manufacturers who sell with long lead times. The main difference between this paper and Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2003) is that, in their paper, the existence of substitute, competing products forms the essence of the argument. In fact, retailer effort as modeled in Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2003) does not increase demand but rather switches customers between products, and thus, absent competing products, the retailer would exert zero effort. Although our conclusions do not disagree with Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2003) , we study a different phenomenon. Both papers are essentially about manufacturers "competing" for the retailer's attention. In our paper, the manufacturer competes for retailer effort with any other activity that the retailer may choose to do or product that the retailer may want to push, since our cost of effort includes the retailer's opportunity cost of exerting effort in other products or chores. In Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2003) , on the other hand, the competition requires two substitute products (i.e. products that consumers would find approximately equivalent). Since the effects defined in this paper would not only exist in the presence of consumer driven competition, but also apply in more general cases (e.g., a retailer that sells two completely independent products), while in Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2003) there would be no effort absent competition, our paper represents a generalization of some of the ideas in Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2003) .
In a model with risk neutral parties, no retailer efforts, no competition or substitute products, zero cost of shortening lead time and no capacity constraints, Iyer and Bergen (1997) also find that manufacturers may still prefer not to implement a short lead time technology. Although we do incorporate the insights from Iyer and Bergen (1997) (calling what drives their result the "safety stock effect"), the main difference with our paper is that Iyer and Bergen (1997) do not model the impact of retailer effort on demand ii . Thus, we complement Iyer and Bergen's ideas, with a new effort effect that interacts with the safety stock effect. We find that the effort effect can reinforce the retailer's incentive to generate demand, and cause manufacturers to choose long lead times, even when a pure safety stock effect would not suffice. Cachon (2004) also describes the incentives retailers have to push what's in stock, but his paper's central concern is a comparison of two types of contracts: a "Push" (i.e. the manufacturer is selling to a newsvendor) and a "Pull" (i.e. the retailer is buying from a newsvendor) contract. Manufacturing lead times are not an endogenous decision in the models of Cachon (2004) and are held constant.
There are a number of other supply chains contract theory papers that consider retailer's effort, e.g., Cachon and Lariviere (2002) and Taylor (2000) . A comprehensive survey on contract theory applied to supply chains is Cachon (2002) . However, other than Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2003) and (2004), we are not aware of other papers that allow the retailer to exert effort after demand has been realized and observed by him, or that consider retailer effort and its impact on the decision to reduce lead times. The timing of effort is key to this paper: the difference in effort effect can only happen if effort is exerted to push sales of what is in stock when demand is low iii . In contrast to Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2003) , discussed earlier, Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2004) , is not about reducing lead time: in their model, lead time is constant and exogenous, and the paper's main concern is about finding coordinating contracts (i.e. achieving first best), in the presence of retailer effort and long lead times, while our paper insights are about the implementation of lead time reduction technologies and not necessarily about achieving first best performance.
The Model
Let there be two risk neutral firms in a supply chain: a manufacturer who sells a product to a retailer that does not carry competing products. The product is sold by the retailer during the period of interest at an exogenously determined price r. The manufacturer produces the product at a cost of c, and sells it to the retailer at an exogenous, constant wholesale price w.
Considering w to be exogenous and not contingent on lead times may seem artificial, in fact Section 5 explores other contractual arrangements, including the case of allowing the manufacturer to set wholesale prices. However, the exogenous w assumption has its own rationale: it allows us to focus our analysis in the effect of lead time reductions alone, we wanted to compare long lead time to short lead time production ceteris paribus (i.e. without changing supply chain contracts concurrently). Moreover, we found case evidence, see Hammond (1994) as an example, that in some cases lead time reduction efforts by manufactures were not accompanied by changes in wholesale prices. This may partly be due to the difficulty that manufactures or retailers have in quantifying the savings stemming from lead time reductions, and to the fact that, at the time of lead time reduction decisions, wholesale prices are already set and changing them may involve complicating negotiations. Not surprisingly, several other papers in the literature have assumed exogenous wholesale prices (e.g., Van Mieghem (1999) , and Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2003) ).
All units left at the end of the period are sold at a marked down price s. Each time end demand is unmet, the retailer incurs a goodwill loss of g dollars. This is, in essence, is a "single period" inventory model (although we do allow for effort decisions to be made subsequent to the random component of demand being realized). Finally, the following conditions are met (i) w ≥ c,
Demand for the product is denoted by e D µ + , where D is a random variable with a strictly increasing and continuous cumulative distribution, expected value E [D] and standard deviation σ; e is the amount of effort that the retailer expends to increase demand for the product; µ > 0 is the sensitivity of demand to such effort. Note that we have separated demand in two components: a deterministic component that depends on e, and a random component that is independent of it. In all cases, we will assume that the retailer can exert effort after observing the realization of D, as in Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2003) and (2004), and, consequently, the retailer can react to high or low realizations of D. We also assume that this effort is uncontractible. The effort has an opportunity cost, e 2 (i.e. the square of the effort iv ) that captures the notion that the marginal cost of effort is increasing in e. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the cost of effort is identical regardless of lead time or demand realization, a difference with Krishan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2004) v . There are two decision points, t = 0, and t = 1. At t = 0, the distribution of D and all its parameters are known to both parties, but the actual realization of demand is unknown. At t = 1, demand is realized, and D becomes a known number vi . Let the retailer's order be for Q units. We model lead time reduction by considering two extreme situations. Under long lead time, "L", the retailer must order Q L at t = 0 (i.e. before the realization of demand), and no further replenishment during the selling period is allowed. Under short lead time, "S", the retailer can order Q S at t = 1 -i.e. after he knows the exact demand he is facing-. We assume that there is no extra cost to the manufacturer to offer short lead time, and there are no capacity constraints on either party. 
General Formulation for Exogenous w

Short Lead Time
Equation (3) can be interpreted as coming from "marginal revenue equal marginal cost".
Since at t = 0 we do not know yet the realization of demand,
* S
Q is a random variable, and
Throughout the paper, proofs to all propositions are in the appendix.
Proposition I (a), (e), and (f) state that the retailer would not order, on average, any more or less if the standard deviation of demand, σ, the goodwill loss on a lost sale, g, or the salvage value s changed. The reasons for this are that: (i) the retailer places orders when residual uncertainty is zero, the manufacturer absorbs all variations on demand; (ii) there are no lost sales of excess inventories. Proposition I (b) states that, the higher the wholesale price, w, the lower the retailer's order. Proposition I (c) and (d) state that, the higher the retail price, r, or the sensitivity of demand to retailer's effort, µ, the larger the average retailer's order. 
Long Lead Time
Retailer's problem
For long lead time, we will use a "backwards induction" dynamic programming technique. First, we will study what the retailer's effort will be at t = 1 under all possible demand realizations, and then we will move to t = 0 to determine the Q that maximizes his expected profits.
At t = 1, there are two cases:
Max Y ( Q ) Q( r w ) ( D e Q )( g ) ( e )
is the retailer's profit function. The first term is the quantity sold times its margin, the second, lost sales times goodwill loss incurred per unit of sale lost, the third, the cost of effort. Equation 
Max Y ( Q ) ( D e )( r w ) ( Q-(D e ))( s w ) ( e )
µ µ
Again, II Y ( Q ) is the retailer's profit function. The first term is net sales; the second term is net loss generated by quantity bought for w and salvaged at s; the third term is the cost of effort. The constraint (7) states that sales cannot be more than Q. The solution to (6) 
Now, going back to t = 0, the optimal order quantity solves: 
and λ is the upper bound of the demand distribution (λ need not be finite). Note that ( Z within each region is defined as:
Equation (12) states that the retailer chooses Q to maximize Z, its profit function. Equation (14) (5), that is, when D > Q and there is a stockout. A similar logic applies to regions II, III, IV, and V. Notice how, depending on the parameter values, certain cases may be infeasible (e.g., the constraint on Q may always bind at t = 1, etc.). As mentioned in the literature review, the model here presented is similar in spirit to that in Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2004) .
In the appendix we show that, if µ = 0, the problem reduces to the regular newsvendor, which is intuitive (once effort does not matter, the retailer facing a long lead time is a pure newsvendor).
Proposition II
(a) If the demand distribution has an infinite upper bound, the retailer's profit function under long lead times is continuously differentiable and concave in Q.
(b) If the demand distribution has a finite upper bound, then the retailer's profit function under long lead times is:
(iii) linear in Q, with negative slope, in region V.
To understand the difference between Proposition II (a) and (b), note that if the demand distribution has an infinite upper bound, then regions III, IV, and V are feasible. Proposition II (iii) implies that region V could never be optimal: since the retailer's profits are decreasing in Q everywhere in this region, the retailer would simply decrease Q until either region III or IV are the proper objective functions. Proposition II (i) and (ii) implies that the optimum must be in either of regions I...IV, is unique, and at the point where the derivative of the objective function equals zero (that is, the derivative that corresponds to a valid region, depending on the parameter values). 
Proposition III
Propositions IV (a) and (b) would be relevant if the parties were not risk neutral, and show how our model predicts an increase in order variability when manufacturers reduce lead time. Also, Proposition IV (b) shows that manufacturer sales are, for short lead times, random, and, for long lead times, deterministic. Note that the manufacturer's profits are her margins times the quantity sold, or simply:
and
Since the manufacturer is risk neutral, in this section we have considered w to be exogenous, and in our model c does not change with lead time, comparing manufacturer's profits is equivalent to comparing Proposition IV(c) means that, under the assumptions of this section (i.e. exogenous w), retailers would always prefer shorter lead times. In addition, the proof of (c) can also be used to prove that, under the assumptions of this model, short lead times are first best.
What Drives Differences in Order Quantities Between Short and Long Lead Time Cases
Absent retailer effort, Iyer and Bergen (1997) show that for the Normal distribution there exist cases where
and cases where
. This is still true once retailer effort is introduced, and general demand distributions are allowed (see the appendix for examples). Therefore, it is possible for manufacturers to lose by moving to short lead times, answering the basic question we proposed in the beginning of the paper. We now proceed to examine the mechanisms driving the result, and the conditions under which long lead times may be preferred.
for two reasons. One, which we term "safety stock effect" has been discussed by Iyer and Bergen (1997) . The second, which we term "effort effect", is introduced by us. The safety stock effect refers to a retailer's willingness to order additional inventory to buffer against demand uncertainty when lead times are long. The effort effect refers to the retailer's willingness to order additional stock when lead times are long to induce himself to exert additional effort after demand uncertainty has been resolved. To isolate and precisely define these two effects, we proceed as follows: first, we precisely define the safety stock effect; next, we define parameter values such that the safety stock effect would be non existent, and call
− in these circumstances the "pure" effort effect.
The Pure "Safety Stock Effect"
Let retailer effort be non-existent or be irrelevant to demand (i.e., let 0 µ = ) -a set up that is a generalization of Iyer and Bergen (1997) 's normal distribution model-. In this case,
exactly the solution to a common newsvendor problem (see appendix for proof). In fact,
With long lead times, the retailer, facing uncertainty about the realization of demand, may buy more or less Q, depending on the value of the parameters (specifically, depending on the ratio of overage cost to overage plus underage cost). 
IE
For example, if this was the only effect present, for normally distributed demand, the manufacturer would only benefit from shortening the lead time of products with critical fractiles below 0.5 This is, in essence, a key result that Iyer and Bergen (1997) present.
We define the "pure safety stock effect" as
or as the difference in quantities ordered between the long lead time and short lead time cases when retailer effort are irrelevant.
The Pure "Effort Effect"
Next, we will define a set of parameter such that the safety stock effect is zero. In the absence of effort, let:
where
Then, we know from the newsvendor that
, making, as predicted, the safety stock effect zero.
However, in the presence of effort it is no longer necessarily true that
Q E(Q ) = under the same cost parameters as above. That is, even if the "critical fractile" is such that a pure newsvendor would order the mean demand,
We define as a pure "effort effect" as
when the above condition on the ratio of overage and underage cost holds. In words, the pure "effort effect" is the change in * i Q due purely to effort exerted by the retailer, independent of any safety stock effects. Note how the "effort effect" can work for both the long lead time and short lead time cases, while the "safety stock effect" is defined as the difference between these two cases absent any effort. From the proof of Proposition II (b), one can notice that, under the short lead time scenario, the retailer exerts a constant effort, while under the long lead time scenario, depending on Q L , the parameter values, and the demand outcome, the retailer can either exert more or less effort than under short lead time. This is a key element of our analysis: the effort effect does not necessarily act with equal magnitude with short and long lead times.
Proposition V
If µ is large enough, and
the "safety stock effect" will eventually be 0, and the "effort effect" will eventually be equal for both cases. 
, just as Proposition V predicted.
However, if 0 w c λ µ
. Therefore, for the uniform distribution, the pure effort effect is always larger for long than for short lead times.
In summary, even if overage and underage costs are equal, there will be many cases where the manufacturer will prefer to continue producing with long lead times. This example shows how, for cases where the retailer's effort can influence demand (but this influence is below a threshold), the effort effect can be significantly reinforced by the retailer's desire to push what he has in stock -which only happens in long lead times-, thus making him buy more from the manufacturer than if he was offered short lead times.
Analysis of Alternate Contracts
Having detected the existence of a problem we now proceed to discuss potential remedies. In other words, if the manufacturer resists lead time reductions fearing lower profits/sales, how can we change supply chain contracts to overcome this?
Price Plus Lump Sum Money Transfer Contracts
If we allow the principal to endogenously set w (the transfer price) and a lump-sum money transfer T, then the manufacturer would always prefer short lead times regardless of the allocation of bargaining power or who is proposing the contract. The solution would simply be to set w = c, and let the parties split the profits via T. In this case, because it would be optimal for an integrated firm to reduce lead time (because it leads to higher channel profits), the parties would do so and split the larger benefit accordingly. One way to interpret this is to imagine that the retailer pays the manufacturer a franchise fee, and that, in exchange for this, the manufacture sells at cost, and with short lead time. This arrangement would truly achieve first best: not only it would make the manufacturer always prefer short lead time, it would also eliminate double marginalization as defined in Spengler (1950), Pasternack (1985) .
It is interesting to note that many leaders in short lead time, for example, Norwalk in the furniture business, Salmon, Raman et al (1998) , Zara in apparel, Ghemawat and Nueno (2003) , Dell in the PC business, Rivkin and Porter (1999) , make the majority of their selling either (i) directly to the customers, (ii) through company owned retail shops, or (iii) through franchisees, and have either not succeed in selling to (Norwalk, Dell), or not tried to sell to (Zara), independent retailers.
Take or Pay Contracts
As suggested in Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2003) , a potentially simple way to induce the manufacturer to reduce lead times when she fears losing sales is to force the retailer to agree to buy a minimum amount of product as a condition for the manufacturer to offer short lead times. In our model, just as in Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2003) , if the manufacturer requires the retailer to buy, at least, * L Q in exchange for short lead time, then both parties would be better off than with long lead times, since offering short lead times would allow both parties to
IE Working Paper
WP06/17 20/02/2006
16 increase quantities in response to high demand. If bargaining power is split, then it would be possible to find some bargained order quantity that would split revenues between manufacturer and retailer to accommodate for this. It is important to notice that this is a second best solution (i.e. it does not achieve coordination), since although such contracts would induce the manufacturer to reduce lead times, the minimum order quantity constrains the retailer's problem and thus limits his options (with respect to no minimum order quantity).
Price Only Contracts with Endogenous Constant Pricing
A third idea is simply to allow the manufacturer to set w endogenously, allowing her to charge a different (potentially higher) price when moving to short lead times. This idea -allowing the manufacturer to propose the retailer price only contracts, with different prices for short and long lead times-seems doable in practice, but is complex analytically: it turns out that the manufacturer's long lead time problem need not be well behaved, not allowing us to reach general conclusions. Nevertheless, we will be able to show by example that these contracts may not solve the problem, making, in some cases, the price setting manufacturer better off staying with long lead times. 
Short Lead Time
( r w ) Max ( w c )E[ Q ( w )] ( w c )( E[ D ])
) 2 µ π
Proposition VI
Under short lead time, the manufacturer's problem is concave in w.
Using Proposition VI, making 
Equation (26) shows that the optimum transfer price w is increasing in the expected value of the distribution, the retail price and the manufacturer's costs and, as expected, decreasing in µ , since a larger µ makes it more lucrative to reduce w to induce more retailer effort.
Long Lead Time
Although the general formulation of the manufacturer's problem under long lead times looks similar to the short lead time problem, things get much more complicated. Lariviere and Porteus (2001) show that, even without retailer' s effort, man L ( w ) π need not be unimodal even if * L Q ( w )was concave in w (which, by the way, is not the case for most common distributions including the normal). Nevertheless, absent retailer's effort, Lariviere and Porteus (2001) are able to find an intuitive condition based on the demand distribution's generalized failure rate. In the presence of retailer's effort, however, we are unable to find such a tractable, general condition that would guarantee that 
Note that, for each w, one must find * Z Q ( w) , by searching Z in all possible regions of validity. Equation (24) states that the manufacturer will set w to maximize her profits given that the retailer will respond to each w by buying her profit maximizing quantity * Z Q ( w ) , as stated by equation (25).
Short vs. Long: a numerical example with Uniformly distributed demand
Although we cannot find a, general, and tractable condition that will guarantee that the problem above is unimodal, we proceed now to present a numerical example where the manufacturer would prefer longer lead times under a wide range of values of µ . In other words, our example shows that allowing the manufacturer to set w does not necessarily make her prefer short lead times.
Let demand be uniformly distributed between [0, 1000], and r = 5, s = 2.5, g = 1, 
That is, for small µ , the manufacturer will achieve higher profits offering short lead times. For intermediate values of µ , the manufacturer will achieve higher profits offering long lead times, and for large values of µ , she will be indifferent between offering short and long lead times.
To sum up, although it may seem, a priori, that the manufacturer could simply offer short lead times at a higher wholesale price than under long lead times, this may not be optimal for her. The wholesale price is forced to serve three purposes (i) induce retailer's effort (which indirectly affects the retailer's quantity ordered), (ii) induce retailer's quantity ordered directly, and (iii) split the total profits between the manufacturer and retailer. The multiple purposes that wholesale price fulfils can create cases when long lead times are more lucrative for the manufacturer. For example, the "effort inducing" effect of w can result in higher effort under long lead times. This has an intuitive explanation: under short lead times, the retailer's marginal return from effort is a constant ( r w ) µ − . In the long lead time cases, the retailer's effort depends on the realization of demand: it may either be more than short lead time effort, because the marginal return to effort can be ( r s ) ( r w ) µ µ − ≥ − , or less than lead time effort, zero if "independent demand" is large enough (see proof of Proposition IV). Under certain scenarios, the manufacturer can effectively exploit the high effort exerted by the retailer when he finds himself with excess inventory making her better off staying with long lead times. For example, in region III, since Q λ > , there are no cases of zero effort, but there exist cases of more effort (than when short lead times are offered).
Finally, if µ is large enough, it will be optimal for the manufacturer to make the retailer stock a quantity that makes region IV valid, thus achieving the same results under long and short lead times. This does not contradict intuition: for µ large enough, generating "deterministic" demand is easy for the retailer, and therefore he will stock so much that the randomness in demand becomes irrelevant for the retailer's effort.
Conclusion
By now, a lot has been said about the cost of long lead times. Reducing lead times could lead to great savings in stockouts and overstocks, allowing products better fitted to customer needs and even mass customization and build-to-order in products raging from jeans to cars. Movements like Quick Response in the apparel industry and Continuous Replenishment in the grocery industry have been striving to reduce lead times as an essential component of the set of practices they preach. Icons like Dell and Zara have built successful business models where short lead times are a key element of their overall strategy. While we agree about the potential for savings and better products that reduced lead times could achieve, this paper presents both a caveat and a possible explanation for the amazing resilience that long lead times have shown in certain cases, even in industries like automotive, where the potential benefits seem among the largest. Such resilience could be attributed to many causes. Our contribution is to highlight, isolate and precisely define two incentives based potential causes that we think should be considered. 
Proof of Proposition 1I
Let λ be the upper bound of the demand distribution, D (λ need not be finite). The proof considers the objective function under the five possible cases, calculates the derivatives with respect to Q in each region, and, finally, evaluates these derivatives at the transition points to show continuity: and proceeds to show that 
To finalize the proof, we need to show that the left and right hand side derivatives at points with , the boundary between regions I and III.
, the boundary between regions II and IV. 
and L Q λ > , the boundary between regions III and IV. From the implicit function theorem, we know that, if x is a parameter in the objective function, then:
Therefore, the sign of the crosspartial derivative in the numerator is equal to the sign of the total derivative.
Next, we will calculate all the crosspartial derivatives for each of the four possible objective functions where the optimum may happen -i.e. for regions I...IV. 
I)
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Proof of Proposition IV
From the table, it can be seen that effort also changes with demand outcomes, and, therefore, in this region,
From the table, it can be seen that effort also changes with demand outcomes, and, therefore, in this region, 
We are unable to sing this crosspartial derivative. However, this is no obstacle. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition VI
